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Hybrid Warfare: Escalation in Europe and Implications for European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization  Ilsa Irfan Department of International Relations, Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore  Abstract Hybrid warfare, the emerging phenomenon of 21st century, has evolved from fourth generation of warfare and blends the use of conventional and unconventional capabilities for achieving strategic goals. It is a fully coordinated warfare which comprise of elements ranging from regular military tactics to terrorists attacks, irregular use of force to violence and criminal disorder, and many more. Hezbollah is first proper prototype which brought the world at the verge of hybrid warfare. Qualitative research method is adopted in this study. To validate my research material and build better understanding to the topic, material has been gathered from various books, journals and articles. My paper, however, focuses on Russian hybrid warfare attempts that have threatened Europe at many levels. Security environment is characterized by the wide range of threats and challenges state poses. The change in the threat perception and the simultaneous change in security environment have contributed in continuous shift in the world order. Similarly, the peril to Europe’s security environment is majorly from east due to Russian intervention in its neighboring European states. Russia has embarked a completely new era of diplomatic assertion within its military capabilities and available arsenals. The eastern border of Europe is insecure due to Russia’s aggressive expansionist policy, by attacking on the center of gravity of states. European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization consider hybrid warfare as the greatest threat to the global peace and security which if not controlled would leave everlasting negative implications for not only Europe but whole world. Therefore, there is need of enhancing cooperation between European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as two are better than one. The individual and collective efforts of both institutions and their implications are further determined by the evaluation of role of United States, particularly Trump’s Presidency. Keywords: Hybrid Warfare, Hybrid Threats, Conventional Warfare, Irregular Warfare, European Union, NATO, Strategic Partnership  1. Introduction: The attack on World Trade Center and Washington was a turning point in the world history. Indubitably, the event of September 11 was not solely a domestic issue of American states but heralded a completely new wave of terrorism. It shook the world altogether and raised many questions on the security dilemma of the major powers. The policy makers and the military planners begin to declare it as the end of an era of war and a dawn of new one.  The beginning of a new era brought its own method of conflict. Many years ago Mao stated that such kind of war will have various constituents and it will become difficult for military to protect the strategic interests of a certain state. Similarly, Prussian theorists also acknowledged that every period will have its own definition and conception of war. Globalization too, has enacted the phenomenon of war perilously. This is beautifully explained in Fukuyama’s “End of History” that the violent activities have badly affected the security of state which is in turn a product of globalization (Fukuyama, 1992). The new era of warfare is now termed as “Hybrid Warfare”. This is one of the biggest challenges of 21st century that is responsible for changing security environment around the world. “Hybrid Wars can be subsumed under different categories of warfare which include conventional and unconventional capabilities, criminal disorder, violence and intimidation by the terrorist groups and felonious tactics” (Hoffman, 2007). Hybrid Wars are either conducted by state actors or non-state actors. These multi-modal activities are either conducted by the same unit or separate units. However, such activities are totally directed and coordinated to achieve the desired goals. According to general conclusion among books, journals, articles and papers written by military officials, strategist, analysts and civilians, the first practical application of hybrid warfare was seen in Israel-Hezbollah War (also known as Lebanon War, 2006), which was later followed by actions of Islamic State in Iraq (2014) and Russian intervention in the Eastern part of Europe. Russia's belligerent actions against Ukraine have significantly challenged NATO’s vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. After the Wales Summit, two different challenges lie in front of NATO and EU from east and south simultaneously. It has, therefore, become a daunting challenge for NATO and European Union to not only defeat but prevent hybrid threats in future. If not controlled, these threats could be proved as more lethal than ever.  The European Union and NATO are strategic partners over more than a decade. Their unique partnership could be accessed from the fact that they share 22 of their member states, and five are the members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Despite the different mandates and objectives of the two organizations, they promote same 
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values and principles (freedom to democracy, protection of human rights and rule of law).  Keeping in view the threat perception in Europe and its implications for the region, EU and NATO should join their hands to fight hybrid warfare and enhance their strategic partnership – as two are better than one. Various analysts, strategists, military and foreign officials consider this as the only remedy to respond to changing security reality, brought about by instability in Europe's Eastern neighborhoods.   2. Evolution of Hybrid Warfare The ways humans wage war and describe the concept of war has drastically changed over the period of time, significantly because of the rapid change in ideas and technology. The perpetual shift in the history of international relations is witnessed with the fall of Soviet Union that ended bipolar world, and give rise to many ethnic and national groups. These groups consider this an opportunity to acquire freedom and independent status through innovative ideas based on their ideological and nationalistic objectives. In the late 1980s, the United States’ marines observed mammoth change in the way groups, particularly the enemies of United States and its allies, engaged in warfare (Williamson, 2009).   2.1 Fourth Generation of Warfare Generally, fourth generation of warfare is defined as blurring the lines between politics and war, civilians and warriors, peace and conflict, and safes zones and battlefield violence. The emergence of national and ethnic groups and spread of globalization, especially the advanced technology, has given rise to fourth generation and put an end to nation state’s monopoly on violence. This new form of warfare is not limited to battlefield only; in fact attacks are conducted in populated regions, urban or rural areas. Mostly, fourth generation of warfare is conducted in decentralized manner, dispersed all over the world with the objective of increasing influence and simultaneously the spread of terror. The vulnerabilities of the adversary are targeted to demoralize and demotivate the opponent force with limited or no physical destruction at all. The decision makers of the state are convinced that their strategies are weak and objectives are unachievable, hence a more focused approach is required. Fourth generation of warfare is not particularly against soldiers; instead it is targeted towards noncombatants, political views, religious ideas, ideological beliefs, media outlets, economic activities, and legal framework, local and international organizations and even minds of people. Theorists believe that the disparity between the resources and ideas of state and non-state actors has introduced new tactics and techniques in the world. Non-state actors are compelled to adopt irregular and asymmetric methods during conflict in an attempt to strike the vulnerabilities of the opponent’s strength, resulting in their defeat. It is, however, important that fourth generation combatants weaken the solidarity of state and create distrust among the society, raising questions on the political capabilities of a state.  2.2  Theoretical Perspective 
 Figure 2.1: Hybrid Warfare Evolution Diagram (Author’s own) 
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Many years ago, various theorists predict of the new era of warfare which will be different from previous in a much complex way. Prussian theorists concluded their study that every period will have its own definition and conception of war. Moreover, Karl von Clausewitz, a military strategist, greatly contributed in explaining the concept of war and how it must be studied. He defined war as an act of violence that compels the opponent force to fulfill the will of the proponent. War is essentially the monopoly of state and the use of force with no logical limits (Gatzke, 1942). Therefore, "absolute war", or total war, can theoretically result from the unconstrained interaction between the offence and defense. 
 Figure 2.2: Clausewitz Trinity Model of War  Source: War, Peace and International Relations, Gray, C.S. 2007. Accessed on                  23rd December, 2016. Clausewitz provided trinity model of war and elaborate that character of war is shaped by the trinity of primeval violence, political objective and its effects, and hatred. Government, military and people are all equally responsible for waging a war. According to trinity model, all these bodies are interlinked and interconnected and shape the nature of war and its intensity. Government is the political representation of society and people from the society are recruited in the military of state. The way each trinity interacts with the other determine the nature of war and shape outcome of war. Any disequilibrium in the “Trinitarian” balance could result in the adverse result for the state or any other group involved in the war. To maintain the equilibrium, it is advised that political and military leaders cooperate with each other to maintain the public opinion and for military leaders to overcome friction, which is the unpredictability of the combat performance. Clausewitz further advocated that the ideal strategy in war-like situation is to identify the enemy’s center of gravity (hub of all power and movement) and defeat them through decisive battle (Bassford, 2003). Clausewitz approach offered basis to modern writers to discuss conception, nature and evolution of war with the changing times. The end of cold war was followed by the emerging fourth generation of warfare. William Lind explains the notion by stating that the prime responsibility of soldiers during peacetime is to get ready for next war and anticipate its kind. The foundation of fourth generation is on the basis of previous generations of warfare, but it clearly differs in its nature, intent and approach. Lind continues to explain the rudiments of forth generation that extends beyond the existing three generations: 1. Mission order empowers the small groups of combatants to function inside the commander’s intent, but with little adaptability. The local flexibility is essential to fourth generation of warfare directed by general guidance which helps in fighting throughout the enemy’s society in a dispersed manner. 2. The more dispersed conflict in the fourth generation of warfare is facilitated by the decreasing dependence of the centralized logistics, which allow the warriors to defend themselves in whatever environment they operate. 3. The traditional practice of massing soldiers and abundance in firepower was taken over by maneuver that can blend in the environment and avoid being targeted. 4. The most significant element of fourth generation of warfare is the ability of learning the internal capabilities of enemy and destroying them through tactical arrangements rather than attacking them physically. Leaders emphasize on the importance of targeting the enemy’s center of gravity in order to destabilize them. It can either through the attack on enemy’s population or on the culture (Lind, 1989). Alongside Lind, Thomas X. Hammes also played a significant role in explaining the concept of fourth generation of warfare. The new form of warfare was not taken seriously by political leaders and military 
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strategists until 9/11. The attack on World Trade Center and Washington marked the absolute end of an era of war and beginning of new one. Hammes asserts that first major development in the fourth generation warfare came with the change in strategy: Fourth generation campaigns shifted from military campaigns supported by information operations to strategic communications campaigns supported by guerilla and terrorist operations. It was a technique to disrupt the internal stability of state by acquiring information and changing minds of people and later society as a whole (Hammes, 1990). Insurgents formed complex coalitions to which Hammes referred as insurgents’ organizational shift. This was another important advancement as the coalitions were not only complex, but totally networked, transnational and trans-dimensional. Similarly, the executors of fourth generation of warfare were building their own unique partnership and expanding links with groups that shared common goals. Hammes described the building of diverse coalitions as the demographic shift (Hammes, 1991). Furthermore, Martin van Creveld emphasized on the concept of transformation of war in his book under the same title. War has transformed over the period of time simultaneously with the changing internal and external security environment. The opponent side is not necessarily supposed to be a state, but a non-state actor. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Clausewitz considers war as a social activity and outcome of social relationships. This builds a connection between nature of war and nature of humanity and all things related to it. State has always remained the main actor that wage war, mainly against another state. Since the nature of war has transmuted, the identities of people who fight in war has also changed. War was the outcome and extension of politics within a state, but it has transformed into the low intensity conflict of ethnic and religious groups, insurgents and guerrillas (Creveld, 2001). Previously, war was about the violent representation of politics that could go to extremes (Booth, 2001). War was cosmopolitan in nature, which meant that people belonging to region having same ideology and identity were bound to act together, whether they agreed or disagreed. Even in old generations of war, the disagreement with the majority’s notion and cause has made the ethnical and religious minorities a liability for the state at war. The current fourth generation of war sees the minorities that are identified as insurgents and such fighting against states or other non-state actors to protect their own identity and values (Creveld, 2002). Similar to Clausewitz connotation of war, Creveld discusses that the way war will be fought would depend on the knowledge of territory and the advancement of technology, both in interstate and low intensity conflicts (Barsanti, 2007). The best example of this could be of Al-Qaeda, or similar groups, that are controlled by several individuals, and have the only strategy of operating in multiple minor conflicts through the use of territorial advantage and technological advancement rather than waging a single major war. Creveld further proclaimed that how technological advancements have transformed the war which negates the idea of Clausewitz, and relate it to Sun Tzu’s art of war (Creveld, 2002). The new military technology and intelligence create uncertainty in the battlefield. This notion was later supported and extended by Lind, for whom the growing contradiction between military culture and increasing disorderliness of the battlefield is the prime reason for the transformation of war (Lind, 2003). The complexity of the situation can be analyzed from the fact that how war has transformed over the years. War is a contemporary phenomenon which is dynamic in its nature and type. The new wave of warfare, however, gained much importance with the increased rate of terrorists’ activities in the very beginning of 21st century. State, non-state actors and various radical groups started opting violent methods for the fulfillment of their political and ideological goals. Globalization, the most prominent global trend, has significantly contributed in intensifying the nature of war. The access to information and technological advancements has made the state and non-state actors self-sufficient. The increased global connectivity has not only shrank the world but provided the means of spread of terror and terror around the world. The massive destruction caused as the result of World War I and World War II in the past has signaled the actors of international system that any such attempt in future would lead the world towards its end. In the globalized world of today, states are investing in advancing their military technologies. The proliferation and easy access to weapons of mass destruction increases the potential for catastrophic attacks, hence absolute war or total war would dramatically disrupt the stability of a region as a whole. The state and non-state actors’, therefore, came up with a new tactic for the attainment of their political and ideological objectives, by the blend of multiple modes of warfare. The main purpose yet remained similar to the executors of fourth generation of warfare that is to determine the center of gravity and destabilize the existing order without any physical destruction. The evolution of war and modification in the techniques and tactics, introduced the world with the new concept of “Hybrid Warfare”.  2.3 Hybrid Warfare Of all the fourth generation warfare theorists, Frank G. Hoffman used the word ‘convergence’ to describe the concept of hybrid warfare for the first time in detail. He discusses convergence of the physical and psychological, violence and peace, combatants and non-combatants, and kinetic and informational approach. However, the 
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major convergence is witnessed within the modes of war. Hybrid Wars can be subsumed under different categories of warfare which include conventional and unconventional capabilities, criminal disorder, violence and intimidation by the terrorist groups and felonious tactics (Hoffman, 2007).  Hybrid warfare is sometimes referred as complex operations, small wars or irregular warfare, which implies the integrated and coordinated deployment of conventional and irregular force capabilities. It comprise of elements ranging from regular military tactics to terrorists attacks, irregular use of force to violence and criminal disorder, and many more. These wars are conducted by state or non-state actors, or the combination of these two in whatever manner. In contrast to guerilla warfare, hybrid warfare is operationally directed and coordinated within the battle space; usually require a proper command and control structure which mostly non-state actors do not have. However, non-state actors with innovative tactics and techniques blend different modes of warfare to achieve desired goals by waging hybrid war. Hoffman warned that the increasing lethality of the blended warfare could pose significant challenges on the internal system of states and eventually lead to disruption of the world order (Hoffman, 2007). 
 Figure 2.3: Components of Hybrid Warfare Source: Hybrid Warfare - Ways of Manifestation and Counteraction from the Euro-Atlantic Perspective, Gheorghe SAVU, 2014. Accessed on 15th January, 2017. As shown in the figure above, hybrid warfare is much diverse phenomenon when discussed in terms of its components. The combinations of two or more components in multiple arrangements, determine the intensity and nature of conflict. The state and non-state actors exploit the modules of warfare to shatter the political, economic and social system of a society. Hybrid warfare can also be considered as less destructive. These wars are not waged in battlefield with militaries and standing armies fighting to protect the interest of their side, unlike absolute or total warfare. The use of conventional capabilities in hybrid warfare is case specific and mainly with the purpose of increasing threat perception in the region (Marcel, 2016). Terrorist attacks or criminal disorder have more psychological effect on the people living in a society and the government than any major physical destruction. The internal chaos and feeling of uncertainty reveals the loop holes to the opponent force, hence making it easy for them to attack in future. However, the historical events and analysis of the evolution of hybrid warfare also highlight the point that the concept is not new; several coercive actions were also witnessed in the open international confrontations in the past. It is only that the greater effect of hybrid warfare was not seen until the beginning of 21st century, since globalization has enacted the phenomenon of war perilously due to interconnectedness and increased economic interdependencies.  2.4 Lebanon War – A Prototype Hybrid Force The first practical application of hybrid warfare lies in the Lebanon war of 2006. Hezbollah was born in 1985 as a typical militia that was engaged in asymmetric warfare, but evolved into organization over time, capable of 
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carrying out variety of modes of war. Hezbollah, one of the many military groups at the time of Lebanese civil group, conducted violent attacks that in no way were either militarily cultured or efficient attempts.  Later in 1990s, the tactics of Hezbollah began to change and improve slightly, as he became Lebanon’s official resistance against Israeli occupations. These tactics mainly remained under the umbrella of asymmetric warfare, but with some additional use of conventional capabilities. The Shia group would attack Israeli positions within the security zone – a stretch of land within Lebanon held by Israel as a buffer against infiltration – and then withdraw to nearby villages and melt away into the civilian population. In response to any Israeli shelling beyond the buffer zone, Hezbollah launched Katyusha rockets into Israel as part of what Nasrallah described as its ‘retribution policy’. Hezbollah applied this tactic only when he thought that the Israeli force has violated any unwritten rule of using violence in a specific area (Gaub, 2015). The great evolution of Hezbollah from asymmetric warfare to more conventional one went unnoticed until the 34-day war with Israel in 2006. The organization exhibited strategies and tactics well past what was expected, and subsequently became the poster child for hybrid warfare. Following the Israeli invasion, Hezbollah completely exploited Lebanon’s rough terrain, which is perfect for the dismounted movement but totally nightmarish for heavily armored move. The inhabited and defendable hill tops on villages were also utilized for their own purpose. The group combined hybrid tactics and advanced military weaponry to defeat the Israeli force. Mortars, rockets, surface to air and surface to water missiles were used, apart from mining the streets used by Israeli tanks (BBC, 2008). Although the Hezbollah force was fewer in number, but was fully coordinated, disciplined and organized. The well-trained unit was fully aware of how to control and invade a territory. Hezbollah also introduced ‘hedgehog defensive tactic’ to demoralize the Israeli force (Piotrowsk, 2015). The hedgehog defensive tactic is the deployment of force in the fortified bunkers as a regular fore. Throughout the conflict, the group continued to launch rockets in Israel using concealed launchers even behind enemy lines. None of these tactics are characteristic of guerrilla forces, which usually rely on population centric methods in order to conceal themselves. Essentially, Hezbollah caught Israel by surprise because it acted in a manner which was not conducive to either an irregular or a state actor. Thus, Hezbollah is first proper prototype which brought the world at the verge of hybrid threat. The concept of hybrid warfare gained much importance after the Lebanon war and became the center of discussion for scholars, theorists and analysts worldwide. State actors, regional bodies and international organizations began to consider this as the threat to liberal peace and human security. They thought it as the dire need to eliminate threat and ensure balance of power among states.  3. Russian Hybrid Warfare Model Security environment is characterized by the wide range of threats and challenges state poses. The change in the threat perception and the simultaneous change in security environment have contributed in continuous shift in the world order. The diverse nature of conflicts and violent activities has resulted in instability among regions. The belt of instability ran from Central America to Eastern Europe, through Northern and sub-Sahara Africa and large Middle East (MENA). However, the nature and intensity of conflicts varies from region to region, because of the distinctive deriving factors. In MENA countries, religious and sectarian conflicts dominate. The large networks of terrorist organizations and the extremists have made the states internally fragile. Islamic state (ISIS) has also blurred lines between state and non-state actors as they have the characteristics of both.  But the major threat the EU and NATO face today is from Eastern and Southern borders, which has successfully affected the peace and security of the whole Europe. This chapter would, however, focus on the Russia’s belligerent attempts in Europe. The peril to Europe’s security environment is majorly from east due to Russian intervention in its neighboring European states. Russia has embarked a completely new era of diplomatic assertion within its military capabilities and available arsenals. Russia has in some case increased its diplomatic pressure on states that are more likely vulnerable; or used covert means like political campaigns, espionage, reconnaissance, subversions etc. to achieve its strategic goals. The main agenda of Russia is to increase its sphere of influence in the European region, in a way that intervention techniques remain below the threshold of Article 5 of Washington Treaty. NATO’s purpose of collective defense is articulated best in Article 5, which states that attack against one member state is considered an attack against all. Therefore, the only buzzword that can explain Russian intervention in European neighboring states is “hybrid warfare”.  3.1 Tools of Hybrid Warfare used by Russia Moscow is not involved in any classical war; instead use confrontational instruments to achieve their desired objectives. Hybrid threat or hybrid intervention is two similar terms that can better justify Russian President, Vladimir Putin’s intentions. Hybrid threat is the combination of military and non-military techniques, applying 
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both ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’. Russian approach of soft power is fundamentally different than the western perspective. In west, soft power is considered as the means to attract different states towards it community. Russia, on the other hand, views soft power as the opportunity to influence and destabilize opposing force through non-military actions. Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept, issued in 2013, used the term “myagkayasila”, meaning soft force. It is clear from here that Russia believes in destabilization of the internal structure of the opponent force by no direct military intervention (Giles, 2015). Russia has numerous tools for implementing ‘soft power’. First and foremost is the tool to influence public opinion that Kremlin uses as propaganda. Russian media, electronic and print, showcase the anti-western propaganda and nationalistic sentiments. The critical analysis over the situation does exist, but the audience is limited due to which their voices are not heard widely (Drent, 2015). The other most effectual tool of Russia is the control over gas and oil’s export. Many of European states are dependent on the Russian energy resources, especially natural gas (see figure 3.1). European dependency factor on natural gas can be calculated from the fact that Gazprom, Russian leading company working on exploration, production, transportation and sale of natural gas, is the largest exporter of national gas to European market. The total Europe’s gas consumption holds nearly 34% of share in Russian gas (Eurostat Data, 2009). Precisely, 86 billion cubic meters of natural gas exported to Europe from Gazprom passes through Ukraine which constitutes almost half of the total (NATO Review Magazine, 2014). Russia’s energy strategy has always aimed to increase European dependency on Russia energy resources. The intensified dependency would strengthen its economic and geopolitical influence in the region, while protecting its domestic security environment and strategic objectives at the same time. But the dependency is not one sided, as claimed by many western economic experts. The mutual interdependence between European Union (EU) and Russia is major reason that Putin never considered EU sanctions to interrupt the energy flow. The exports of Russia’s energy resources accounts for approximately 50% of its revenues (NATO Review Magazine, 2014). Deep analysis of Europe-Russian energy supply indicates that Russia could survive for almost a year without European investments and technologies, but it is extremely impossible for Europe to live for 30 days without Russian natural gas. Russian Siloviki (Russian word meaning military and security officers) referred to it as “asymmetric interdependency” (NATO Review Magazine, 2014). 
 Figure 3.1: European States Dependence on Russian Gas Source: http://beyondthe.eu/gazprom-vs-chevron-a-battle-of-titans-over-the-future-of-an-energy-island/. Accessed on 29th January, 2017. Kremlin continuously used the energy exports as a political power tool to increase the influence on Eastern Europe, particularly Kiev (capital of Ukraine). Political will was imposed on the vulnerable states by either deploying national military forces or through covert actions. United States termed these instruments of national power as DIME, which consists of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic tools. The series of events in the past justifies Russia’s extensive use of national power instruments in the best interest of the country. Russia always ensured that any engagement in foreign affairs and employment of DIME must remain below threshold of Article 5 (Washington Post, 2015). 
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3.2 Russia’s Strategic Goals Hybrid warfare, convergence of multiple modes and techniques of war, is the means of Russia for accomplishing its broader strategy. In 2014, Edward Lucas of The Economist specified Russia’s key strategic goals in an event: 
• To reestablish Russian empire, similar to Soviet Union; 
• To obstruct European Union attempt of controlling energy pipelines; 
• To weaken European region and divide west (The Economist, 2014). In western perspective, increased economic interdependency is a way to prevent future conflicts, which is less likely considered the rationale of President Vladimir Putin. In an interview with Buzzfeed, President Barack Obama explained Putin’s world view in these words: “I think he looks at problems through this Cold War lens, and, as a consequence, I think he’s missed some opportunities for Russia to diversify its economy, to strengthen its relationship with its neighbors, to represent something different than the old Soviet-style aggression” (BuzzFeed News, 2015). Since 2007, many of the components of Russian Hybrid Warfare Model (RHWM) have been applied in attempts to create political upheavals in the eastern part of Europe. These include: Georgia in 2008, and Crimea and Ukrainian Crisis in 2014. Russia considered the implementation of RHWM as the only way to achieve its strategic objectives and strengthening its position.  3.3 Georgia The five-day Georgian War in 2008 was the pinnacle of long years of rivalry and aggravation between Russia and Georgia, as stated in the EU-commissioned report. Despite Georgians attempt to open fire at first, both sides were equally blamed. President Vladimir Putin made many derogatory statements to justify Russia’s actions in South Ossetia (Gobronidze, 2016).  Georgia, formerly called us Georgia Soviet Socialist Republic (Georgia SSR), was one of the 15 republics of Soviet Union. After gaining sovereignty over Soviet laws, Georgia became independent in 1990 before the dissolution of Soviet Union. It was then named to Republic of Georgia and each of SSR became an independent Sovereign state. Similarly, South Ossetia is a state located in the area of former Georgia SSR and is partially recognized (CNN, 2017). Russia, thereby, has great interest in the region in order to fulfill its agenda of recreating Russian empire and reoccupying states that were originally part of Soviet Union. In the EU report, Russian claims of Georgian genocide and extermination of around 2000 civilians by Georgian forces were cogitated as highly exaggerated (EU Report, 2009). The report accused South Ossetian irregular forces for violating rules of war in while conducting attacks. The Russian policy of “passportization” based on the redistribution of passports and granting citizenship to Russian speaking people compelled Russia to send its paramilitary forces in the region and prepare them for armed hostilities (Agnia, 2016). Since majority of Russian nationals resided in South Ossetian, Moscow thought that it is justified to protect its own citizens. As a result, a full scale operation (air, land and sea) was launched on Georgia on August 8, 2008 (Georgia Today, 2015). Russia’s act was in order to surpass NATO’s strategy of military intervention and prevent it from invading any sovereign country within Russia’s historic “sphere of influence”. The utilization of cyber warfare methods and information campaigns before and after the conflict marked Georgia War as the perfect example of RHWM. 
 Figure 3.2: Map demonstrates Area of Conflict in Georgia War Source: Battle of South Ossetia, All World Wars, 2008. Accessed on 4th February, 2017. 
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3.4 Russian Military Doctrine The hybrid warfare, as discussed in the previous chapter, was also not a new concept for Russia. The Russian military doctrine published in 2010, in response to Georgia War, states that the modern warfare is combined use of military force, along with political, economic, informational and non-military means.  As the doctrine does not provide any further explanation on how the hybrid warfare must be conducted, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of Russian Federation wrote in his article that the lines between peace and war are blurred. He uses the word “non-linear warfare” to better describe the meaning of hybrid threat. The blend of multiple modes of warfare results in special kind of war that is based on non-traditional practices. According to him, the use of non-military means sometimes surpasses the power of use of weapons and military force for achieving strategic and political objectives (Gerasimov, 2013). The non-military means include: diplomatic pressure, formation of coalitions, building of politico-military relations, cyber war, information war, economic sanction, reconnaissance, espionage and using techniques to reduce the intensity of the conflict. The Gerasimov Doctrine also underlines the significance of cyber security in hybrid warfare. The unauthorized access to computer programs, networks and websites could also help the rival group to disrupt the communication networks. This could pose serious threat to the internal stability of the state (Gerasimov, 2013). Putin found RHWM as the best option to influence its neighborhood, especially Ukraine. Ukraine is not a fully functioning state, while Russia is a state with proper central system and complete control over all the instruments used in hybrid warfare. The prime objective of Kremlin’s involvement in Donbas is to keep Ukraine in permanent destabilized state, and to prevent Kiev from building closer ties with both EU and NATO. The biggest fear of Putin is to see a stable and well-functioning Ukraine, which could be threat for the Russia’s autocratic regime.  3.5 Beginning of Protests in Kiev The conflict in Ukraine initiated when the Russian-backed Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, refused to sign a single economic deal with European Union that was related to the association agreement. European Union started looking for more eastern economies to build trade relations with them, while Ukraine had it interests in modern Western Europe’s economies. Ukrainians realized that the refusal of signing association agreement with European Union meant that President had surrendered in front of Russian president, Vladimir Putin, which later became evident when the Ukrainian President accepted $15 billion in aid along other economic benefits from Russia (Peter, 2015). This triggered the Ukrainian population who were dissatisfied with the actions of their President and highly condemned the government’s corruption. As a result of this, thousands of Ukrainians came out on streets of Kiev and protested against the existing government. They demanded immediate resignation of the President and raised their voices for the economic reform. Ukrainian government, however, responded to the situation vigorously and aggressively. Protestors were descended by the riot police, armed guards and armed military personnel. The videos of the aggressive actions against the protesters went viral on YouTube Channel that heightened the tensions between them (Euromaidan Press, 2015). The death toll increased up to hundreds in the mid-February 2014 (Thompson, 2017). The chances of talk between Ukrainian President and the opposition leaders for peaceful settlement were less likely. The opponent force later in February took control of Kiev. The President fled away to Russia to save his life as the protestors were very much violent.  3.6 Crimea Following the ousting of Ukrainian President, the revolution also initiated the political crisis in Crimea. Crimea, Ukrainian province, once had population that constituted more than 50% of ethnic Russian (Simon, 2014).  Primarily, the crisis was against the Ukrainian interim government that later escalated to an extent that it became difficult for Ukrainian administration to control.  A meeting was called by President Vladimir Putin on 22nd February to discuss the crisis situation and possibility of the liberation of the ousted President. The meeting concluded on the note that Russia must focus on reoccupying Crimea. Within few hours, several protests and marches supporting Russian sentiments began in Crimean city of Sevastopol (Mark, 2014). Pro-Russian protestors raised flags and took out rallies against the existing Ukrainian government. In response to this, Russia set up a parallel government alongside the creation of ‘civil defense squads’. Within no time, Russia gained support of the majority who refused to pay taxes to Ukrainian government and began to chant slogans, “Putin is our President”. Moreover, check post was established by Russian troops on the main road to Sevastopol. Few of the check posts were also located on areas that clearly divide Ukraine from Crimea (Mark, 2014). 
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On February 27, 2014, the Supreme Council of Crimea and few other strategic sites were occupied by Russian Special Forces, known as ‘little green men’ without any emblem on their uniforms. The display of Russian flags became more common. Considering the situation, Crimean Parliamentarians immediately called a session. During the session, majority voted to replace the Prime Minister and dismiss the Ukrainian affiliated government. The Prime Minister, Sergey Aksyonov, of Russian Union Party was elected to hold office. The parliament also voted to hold a referendum on greater autonomy on May 25. To avoid external interference in parliamentary actions, Russian Special Forces cut all sources of communication from building. Many politicians claimed that they were forced to cast vote against their will (CNN, 2016). Upon the orders of newly elected Prime Minister, Aksyonov, the control of Ukrainian installations in the Crimean peninsula was taken by de facto authorities. He later appealed for Putin’s support in ensuring peace in the region. Russia considered this an opportunity to intervene in the region and increase its sphere of influence (BBC, 2016). Immediately after receiving authorization from Federation Council of Russia for military intervention under the pretext, “until normalization of socio-political environment in the country exist”, Russian forces carried out overt actions. Helicopters and tanks were used to gain complete control over Crimea. Russia denied its interference in Crimean peninsula until April 17, 2014, in spite of the fact that numerous media reports indicated the presence of Russian soldiers as unmarked troops. Putin admitted Russian backing of separatist groups in Crimea and similar justification as Georgia War was given by him. He explained that intervention was in the best interest of people so that they can easily express their choice (Weaver, 2015). A referendum deciding the status of Crimea was held on March 16. As a result of referendum, Supreme Council of Crimea announced formal independence of Crimea and the city Sevastopol. On March 18, 2014, both demanded for reunification with Russian Federation. The treaty was submitted and then ratified on March 20, declaring the March 18 as the official date of Russian annexation of Crimea (Walker, 2014).  3.7 Illegal Annexation of Crimea Ukraine and the rest of the West regarded the annexation of Crimea as illegal. Ukraine justifies its claim by stating that the annexation was the clear cut violation of Budapest Memorandum. The memorandum was signed in 1994 between three nuclear states: United States of America, Russian Federation and United Kingdom, during OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary. The memorandum was one of the security assurance measures to protect the borders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The idea of no use force against the territorial integrity of states was promoted. This claim of Ukraine was later negated by member of European Parliament, Marine Le Pen during her speech in December 2016. She proclaimed that the referendum was organized by Kremlin and the results of which clearly showed the residents of Crimea were in favor of this reunification, due to which there is no point of challenging the results of referendum (Independent, 2017). 
 Figure 3.3: Map of Disputed areas in Eastern Europe and Crimean Peninsula. Source: Karklis, L. The Washington Post. Accessed on 4th February, 2017. 
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3.8 Ukrainian Crisis The tensions heightened in Ukraine with the annexation of Crimea. On April 15, 2014, Kiev’s government made its first formal military action in the eastern part of Ukraine against the pro-Russian rebels, who had seized government buildings. Soon after this, Putin asserted that Ukraine is on the brink of civil war. Luhansk and Donetsk, eastern cities of Ukraine, declared their independence after unrecognized referendums (McMahon, 2014). Month later, elections were conducted in Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko, also known as Chocolate King, won the elections with majority and appointed as new President of Ukrainian Government on May 25. He accused pro-Russian separatists group of preventing people to vote in violence-wracked eastern Ukraine. The association agreement, which was rejected by former President, was also signed by the new President Poroshenko. This signaled Russia that Europe is in full support of Ukraine’s western sentiments (BBC, 2017). Consequently, Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shut down above the rebel occupied area in east through a surface-to-air missile. For many days, rebels blocked the entry of foreign monitors to the crash site and carry out any investigation. Hundreds were killed in the crash. On September 20, Ukraine and pro-Russian separatists mutually agreed to ceasefire and curtail the rising tensions. Buffer zone was established to avoid further over actions of aggression, and it required withdrawing all sort of weaponry from frontal lines of conflict (BBC, 2017). Numerous media reports and NATO’s assessments specified the Russian violations of ceasefire. Russia sent its troops; trucks filled with weaponry and tanks across the Ukrainian border, and denied its presence in any such activity. According to UN reports, Ukrainian crisis of 2014 affected the lives of around 1.7 million people who terribly suffered from the violence that further exacerbated the conflict (Shevchuk, 2016). President Poroshenko realized that there was a need of foreign intervention in the matter and asked International Criminal Court of The Hague to investigate all crimes against humanity during the period of crisis. Europe was however, against the idea of arming the forces in Ukraine as they suspected it would further ignite the conflict (CNN Library, 2017). Towards end of February, 2015, the ceasefire got into effect but around 300 violations of ceasefire were reported. European Union thereby imposed sanctions on Russia to put a halt to its holistic actions that have already resulted in the death of large number of people. Russia took the sanctions as unjustified and illegal (Luhn, 2015). In 2016, United Nations warned that the fragile ceasefire has further increased the number of deaths and casualties, and isolated the people of eastern Ukraine from rest of the region. These included civilians, Ukrainian armed forces and rebels. The testing of missiles near Crimea in December 2016 was not well perceived by Russia (Luhn, 2015). They called it as the violations of international agreement. In the early days of Donald Trump’s administration, the fighting between rebels and Ukrainian government escalated, increasing the threat perception of the Europe. Table 3.1: Russian Hybrid Warfare Tactics in Georgia and Ukraine(Author’s own) Georgia War 
• 5 Day War in 2008 
• Large number of deaths 
• South Ossetia unrecognized  Republic. Ukrainian Crisis • Started in 2014 – till present • Large number of deaths • Luhansk & Donetsk  Unrecognized republics.    
• President of unrecognized South Ossetia confirmed the entry of volunteer fighters.   • President of unrecognized Donetsk confirmed the entry fighters that are trained in Russia.   
• Russian forces attacked on Georgian soldiers.   • Russian forces massacred Ukrainian troops.   
• Unilateral ceasefire violated by militia groups.   • Mutually agreed ceasefire violated by rebels.    
• Russia denied the entry of military vehicles across the Georgia border.   • Despite the entry of illegal trucks loaded with weaponry, Russia denied the presence of its troops. 
Russian Hybrid Tactics in Georgia and Ukraine Similarity Index Special Forces and Volunteer Fighters arrived from Russia Involvement of Russian Regular Forces in the Armed Attacks Ceasefire Violated by Rebellious Forces Claims Denied by Russia 
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3.9 Putin’s Reflexive Control Action  Since 2014, Russia has been using advanced form of hybrid warfare that is based on the component of information warfare. Information warfare is the use and management of information, communication tools and technology in quest for an upper hand over the adversary. Russians describe this use as “reflexive control”.  Reflexive control causes the rival to choose options that are in the best interest for Russian agenda by molding the foe’s view of the circumstance conclusively. Moscow has used this technique in order to persuade U.S and its European allies to play a role of passive participant in the Russia’s efforts of dismantling Ukraine through hybrid warfare tactics (Thomas, 2004). The west, on the other hand, started to opt ways to counter hybrid threat so that they can succeed in this era of warfare. However, the reflex control strategy of Russia does not have any theoretical background. This dates back to the period of cold war, where Soviet Union developed all the related concepts and techniques. Thus, the Russian strategy of today is unimaginative and a blend of both traditional and innovative ways, mainly based on Soviet work that the Russian leaders are already aware of. The primary aim of Russia’s reflexive control techniques is to increase its influence in west, while simultaneously dismantling Ukraine.    The main components of Russia’s reflex control techniques are as follows: 
• The first and foremost technique is to obscure the presence of Russian forces in Ukraine so that the denial and deception operations can be conducted secretively. This includes the sending of military personnel, known as ‘little green men’, in uniforms without badges; 
• Disguising the Moscow’s ambitions in the contention which sows fear in a few and permits others to influence themselves that the Kremlin’s points are restricted and eventually satisfactory; 
• Holding externally conceivable legality for Russia's activities by denying Moscow's inclusion in the conflict, requiring the international community to perceive Russia as an intrigued power, instead of the party to the conflict, and indicating to evidently equivalent western actions, for example, the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in the 1990s and the attack of Iraq in 2003; 
• Deployment of complex global efforts in order to shape the account about the Ukraine strife through formal and social networking (Snegovaya, 2015).  3.10 Threats for Europe The results of the Russian efforts have been mixed. Russia tried keeping the western forces from intervening physically in Ukraine, simultaneously utilized the time in expanding its own military strength in the conflict. It has sowed strife within the NATO alliance and raised tensions between potential foes about how to react. Russian armed forces and military capabilities clearly lag behind the Western forces, well-organized and well-trained, which are capable of engaging and conducting complex military operations at a larger scale. Few experts believe that the Russia’s intervention in Ukraine does not signify that Russian military is capable of conducting full-scale war with the use of all conventional techniques against NATO in future (Renz, 2014). Russia shares its border with Ukraine and Georgia (see figure 3.2 and 3.3) due to which the threat from eastern borders of Europe has escalated over the period of time. The Georgia War of 2008, Annexation of Crimea and Ukrainian Crisis best provides the understanding to Russian Hybrid Warfare Model. The overt and covert tactics adopted by Russia in these conflicts, clearly highlights the intentions of Russia to increase its sphere of influence by disrupting the internal structures of more likely vulnerable states of Europe. Since most of the natural gas is exported to European states via Ukraine, the control over Ukraine would threaten the economic progress of the west as a whole. The European security is under serious threat due to emergence of hybrid threats. Europe finds it difficult to counter hybrid threats as the techniques and tactics of the opponent force are always difficult to determine. Russian intervention in Eastern Europe has never unveiled its policies and strategies to the western world. The information war in the globalized world of today has further complicated the situation for west. The Russian hybrid attempts conducted at peace time has vastly affected the security environment of Europe. The European forces are puzzled as to what next move would help in overcoming the threat perception. It has also, therefore, became one of the significant challenges for European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  4. EU and NATO Response towards Hybrid Threats In the recent years, scholars around the world initiated a debate over the need and how far North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a defense alliance, is necessary in the 21st century. The outbreak of two major nuclear wars (WWI and WWII) and its dramatic global consequences have warned the states from waging any full-scale nuclear war in future. Since then, states have shifted their interests from territorial gains to economic gains up to much extent. Countries have either reduced or suspended their defense spending and increased their trade by increasing the dependency level, thus preventing future conflicts.  The existence of NATO was widely discussed in international platforms until the Russian interference in 
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Europe. The illegal annexation of Crimea and Russian intervention in Ukraine brought the debate to halt and opened new discussion for the international players. The importance of the alliance became clear with the Russian attempts. Putin’s Russia uses multiple modes of warfare to achieve its strategic goal and objectives. The blend of conventional and unconventional ways, and the use of political, economic and cyber measures, diverted the attention to the new emerging phenomenon of hybrid warfare. Hybrid warfare has substantially affected the security environment of Europe and introduced EU and NATO to new intensified challenges and threats. These institutions understand that if the threats are not countered and responded effectively, then the globalized era of today will leave everlasting negative implications for not only Europe but whole world.  4.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NATO is an alliance that develops a transatlantic link between countries from Europe and North America. The core purpose of this alliance is to protect and ensure the freedom and security of its member states through political and military means. The political means include the consultation and cooperation of states on defense and security issues through the development of democratic structures, and simultaneously preventing any conflict like situation. Military means, on the other hand, encompass the use of conventional methods to respond to any threat and defeat the opponent force. NATO, however, believes in peaceful resolution of conflicts through diplomatic means and considers the use of military as the last resort. The 2010 Strategic Concept lays down NATO’s core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security (NATO Strategic Concept, 2010). Putin’s hybrid intervention in Ukraine (2014) brought the attention of NATO to one of its core tasks, collective defense, explained in Article 5 of Washington Treaty. Washington treaty, along with many other minor and major treaties, was signed in International Conference on Naval Limitation called by United States, to limit the arm race and work on security arrangements. As set out in Article 5 of Washington treaty, NATO must protect and defend the territories and population of its member states against all threats. NATO essentially relies on the principle that the attack against one is considered to be attack against all. NATO has continuously strived to build stronger ties with Russia, particularly through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, in order to cooperate on the security issues. Russia’s action are thought as the breach of all the principles and international commitments (1997 Basic Document of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, and 2002 Rome Declaration) between two parties in the past, which underlie strong NATO-Russia relationship. It not only broke the trust but challenged the basic principles of security of Euro-Atlantic region, and resulted in the suspension of all practical ways of cooperation. In a recent 2017 meeting of NRC, NATO still showed its willingness to carry out an open political dialogue with Russia to reduce misunderstanding and increase predictability. 4.1.1 Wales Summit On September 5, 2014, the head of states and government officials of the member countries of North Atlantic Council gathered in Wales to discuss the transnational and multi-dimensional threats, challenging the security of Euro-Atlantic region. The decisions were made to deter the hybrid threats of today and tomorrow. Russian hybrid warfare has significantly challenged the vision of Europe as whole, free and at peace (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).  The head of states reaffirmed their commitment for the fulfillment of core tasks of 2010 Strategic Concept, particularly collective defense, in the Wales Summit Declaration. The member states assured that they are adapting several operations, strengthening partnership with other states and organizations, to build and improve the security environment around the globe. In response to hybrid threats, Readiness Action Plan was approved by the 28 member states.  4.1.2 Readiness Action Plan (RAP) RAP’s key purpose is to ensure that NATO is fully prepared to respond swiftly and strongly to changes in security environment, especially to challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare. It is also an attempt to strengthen the NATO’s collective defense and crisis management capabilities. NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg also claimed that RAP is the biggest fortification in the collective defense since the end of cold war. RAP has two main pillars: Assurance Measures and Adaptation Measures. These measures indicate that although NATO believes in diplomatic conflict resolution but is fully equipped to carry out military attacks, if needed (Wales Summit declaration, 2014).  4.1.2.1 Assurance Measures The Assurance Measures is the series of land, air and maritime activities in, on and around the territory of NATO Allies, beside the increased military presence in the Eastern part of Alliance. It is basically to reduce the threat perception in Europe, strengthen NATO’s defense capability, deter aggression and reassure population support. The assurance measures, contributed by all 28 member states/allies, can be scaled up or down depending on the changing security environment. 
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Following are the prominent measures since May 2014: 
• Increase in number of fighter jets (from 4 to 6) for air-policing in Baltic region; 
• Commencement of surveillance flights (AWACS72) in the eastern part of Alliance; 
• Patrolling of increased number of ships in Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Sea; 
• Deployment and training of ground and air forces in the Eastern Europe, to carry out military exercises on rotational basis; 
• Conducting more than 200 NATO national exercises since the Wales Summit Declaration (NATO Fact Sheet, 2016). 4.1.2.2 Adaptation Measures Adaptation measures were taken in order to increase the readiness and allow the alliance to firmly respond to all sorts of security challenges and threats. It is the long term change in the NATO’s military posture and capabilities. These measures are as follows: 
• Enhancing of NATO Response Force (NRF) to make it more capable of responding to threats; 
• Creating a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), by deploying several thousand groups supported by air, maritime and Special Forces; 
• Increasing number and type of ships and enhancing Standing Naval Forces; 
• Establishing NATO’s permanent multinational command and control system along the territories of Eastern Allies, for example, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania; 
• Focusing on collective defense and crisis management exercises by the member states, and updating defense strategies in Eastern Europe; 
• Improving the readiness and capabilities of the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczec in Poland and advancing its role as hub for regional cooperation; 
• Pre hand setting of military equipment and supplies; 
• Preparing national infrastructure of Eastern Allies for expanding NATO’s ability to reinforce them (NATO Fact Sheet, 2016). 4.1.3 Readiness Action Plan and Russia The member states of North Atlantic Treaty Organization responded to Russian hybrid threats through the immediate approval and formulation of Readiness Action Plan. Their intention was to convey the message to Putin’s regime that attack on any European state would be considered an attack against all. The measures taken under this plan signaled that European states are self-sufficient and NATO despite believing in peaceful resolution is ready to wage conventional warfare. But it is important to analyze that whether this message is successfully conveyed to Russia. Russia possesses the characteristics of modern states while most of the NATO allies are post-modern states. The states termed as modern when there in strict separation between domestic and foreign affairs, strongly condemning and prohibiting the involvement of foreign actors in the domestic affairs. Post- modern states, however, believe in mutual interference and surveillance in domestic affairs under the agreed lines. There is weak distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. These states are the promoters of the peaceful resolution of conflicts with limited or no use of force (Lendman, 2014). As a result of Assurance Measures, the largest exercises of NATO had around 6000 participants, while Russia deployed around 100,000 personnel in various air, maritime and land exercises. According to NATO’s post-modern approach, the count of 6000 is a huge military exercise but this is still much less than the Russian count. It indicates the aggressive intentions of the modern state, Russia (RAP, 2017).  Looking at the Adaptation Measures, the implementation of the large portion of it is witnessed in the NATO’s allies near the Russian border. The NATO’s deployment of forces and increase in the long term military capabilities negates the NATO’s claim of not expanding in eastward direction, during German Unification. The further geographic or quantitative expansion of forces would mean that Russia has succeeded in posing threat in the whole Europe.  4.2 European Union (EU) European Union is the politico-economic union that was established after the aftermath of Second World War to foster the economic cooperation and promote free trade all over the region. Its allies consist of 28 European States. The core purpose of European Union is to avoid future conflicts by increased economic interdependency between states. It was initially known as European Economic Community (EEC) (founded in 1957) with six member states willing to establish economic ties. Since then free market was established and more European powers became its members. Later in 1993, EEC evolved into EU and the organization policy processes expand from climate and health to security challenges and migration issues. Various treaties are signed and ratified by the member states on 
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issues with mutual understanding and cooperation (EUROPA, 2017). 4.2.1 Security Environment European Union’s security environment changed drastically with the increased threat perception and diverse nature of conflicts. It became important for European Union to adapt its role as security provider by increasing its capacity and capability. Since EU succeeded in establishing a free trade area, it means that at certain part of Europe would ultimately have radical implications for the rest of the region. The President of the European Commission, the executive branch of European Union, said that there is a dire need to combine national and European instruments to respond to threats. 4.2.2 Response to Hybrid Threats Russian illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine (2014) highlighted the Russia’s aggressive expansionist policy which poses a threat to unity and interdependency of European states and European Union itself. The blend of various tools of warfare became a new and emerging threat for Europe which was difficult to counter. European Union was much aware of the fact that if the hybrid threats from eastern and southern borders were not controlled in future, then it would disrupt the economy of the whole region. Several meetings, committees discussed the issue at the common platform and took several measures to respond to hybrid threats and tackle the situation (European Commission, 2016). 4.2.2.1 Foreign Affairs Council  On March 3, 2014, the EU ministers of foreign affairs met in the Foreign Affairs Council to discuss the Russian intervention in Ukraine. The Council highly condemned the Russian attempts in the Eastern Europe and declared that as the violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty under international law. Further, the authorization of Federation Council of Russia for the deployment and use of armed forces in the region were also criticized by the officials (EEAS, 2017). In the respect of international law, European Council advised the European Union’s ministers to resolve the conflict peacefully. Russia was asked to withdraw its permanently stationed troops, especially Black Sea Fleet stationed in Ukraine. Ministries further ensured the support to Ukraine by applying and implementing numerous responsive measures (Consilium, 2016). 4.2.2.2 Suspension of G8 Summit European Union and other member states temporarily suspended their activities in the preparations of next G8 summit in Sochi in June, 2014, until the security environment is under control (Times of India, 2014). G8 is referred as the group of eight highly industrialized nations that meet annually in conference to decide the global issues (economic growth, crisis management, global security, terrorism, energy crisis etc.) and find the remedies to them with mutual consensus. These nations include, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Canada, United States and the United Kingdom. The suspension of G8 summit was to clearly pass on the message to Russian to refrain from conducting any future hybrid warfare attempts in Europe as that would then cause negative implications for the internal economy of the country.  Russia being a prominent player in G8 was aware of the repercussions of further suspension in the preparations of G8 summit.  4.2.2.3 Restrictive Measures Head of states of European Union and government of Ukraine held a meeting to decide the future of Ukraine by concurrently defeating hybrid attempts in the region on March 6, 2014. The individual restrictive measures were imposed on the Russian and Ukrainian officials that were suspected of being responsible in carrying out the hybrid threats. Initially, restrictive measures were taken against 21 officials in 2014, which later on extended to 150 people and 37 entities. These people greatly affected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Ukraine. European Union and the Council ordered to freeze their assets and enforce travel bans, restricting them from freely travelling around the European region (EUROPA, 2017). 4.2.2.4 Economic Sanctions on Russia Economic sanctions were imposed on Russia, affecting the exchange of goods across the borders. European Union leaders also requested to further broaden the sanctions if Russia does not prohibit from destabilizing Ukraine and its neighborhood. The EU leaders intended to align the sanctions along the implementation of Minsk Agreement. It was foreseen that the Minsk Agreement would be implemented by the end of 2015 but failed even by December 31of the same year. The Council first extended to July, 2016 and later prolonged it to January 2017. After the careful assessment of the implementation of Minsk Agreement, the sanctions were extended for another 6 months which is not expected to end by the end of September (European Council, 2017).  Russia is facing these sanctions in the following ways: 
• Ban on trade, both import and export; 
• Curbing the Russian access to certain advanced technologies that could speed up the oil-production and exploration process; 
• Constraint access to essential and optional capital markets;  
• Ban for dual-use goods for both military use and military end clients. 
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4.2.2.5 Refusal of the acceptance of Annexation of Crimea The European Union’s policy does not recognize the annexation of Crimea. The Council, therefore, adopted measures to implement the EU’s policy of “non-recognition of illegal annexation of Crimea”. The goods from Crimea were not accepted by other states until they are authorized and certified by Ukrainian government. Moreover, since December 2014 there has been a complete prohibition on investment, alongside the ban on the tourism services in Crimea (Burke, 2014). 4.2.2.6 European Strategic Agenda European Union realized that there is dire need of adopting European Strategic Agenda for the successful countering of the diverse nature of conflicts, described as hybrid threats or hybrid warfare by the European states. On June 27, 2014, European leaders, high representatives and the European Council discussed the future, priorities and purpose, of Europe in a meeting held in Brussels (BBC, 2016).   European Strategic Agenda outlines the following priority areas to shape the EU’s work on long-term basis: 1. Increasing Competitiveness and Growth European Union highlights the need of the establishment of stronger economies to increase investment and promote competitiveness. EU believed that this would in turn open more job opportunities for people. Few of the actions include: 
• Establishment of single digital market by 2015; 
• Investment for the better infrastructure; 
• Expanding SME’s access for financing; 
• Acquire economic policy coordination and euro area governance; 
• End of the negotiations process with regards to Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership by 2015 (Baimbridge, 2015). 2. Empowerment of the Citizens In order to empower the citizens, it is important to respect their privacy and protect them from all potential threats. Security must be ensured so that the progress of the country does not slow down. Considering the increased hybrid threats in region, there was utmost need of strengthening this point in EU strategic agenda so that a strong message can be conveyed to the rival force. Actions taken under this include: 
• Preventing tax fraud; 
• Continuous drives against youth unemployment (Gray, 2004). 3. Energy and Climate Policies Energy and climate policies were adopted by European Council to reduce the dependency of European states on Russian oil and other resources. It was to make the countries self-sufficient and enhance energy security (discussed later in this chapter). 4. Justice and Freedom Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine has greatly undermined the security of the region. As a result of this, European Council underscores the need of good cooperation between member states, particularly in security sector. Following are some of the actions taken by EU to promote justice and freedom in the region and setting precedent for the rest of the world: 
• Improved management of migration activities and border control; 
• Carrying out counterterrorism actions and combating organized crime; 
• Increasing cooperation between EU allies (The Telegraph, 2017). 5. EU – A Global Actor The chief and vital of objective of European Union is and has always been to showcase it as the strong global actor. EU is widely engages in the global affairs and to further continue this trend, EU must set its priorities right, such as: 
• Ensure consistency between EU foreign policy goals and its member states; 
• Promote democracy and stability in countries related to EU; 
• Engage international powers in global issues like trade, terrorism, human rights, security etc.; 
• Strengthen its common security and defense policy. 4.2.2.7 Enhancing Energy Security Most of the European states were dependent on Russian oil for smooth running of their industries. The major part of income of these states relies on the trade (export and import). Industrialization and increased trade contributes in uplifting the economy of a particular state, making it self-sufficient. European Union understands the dependency of European states on the Russian oil but argues that Russia is also economically dependent on Europe for many things. The technological advancement of Europe attracts the industrialized state to import technology from this region. Europe aims to reduce its dependency on Russia and thus many counter measures were taken by the Union. 
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EU invested billions of euros on their economy and other sectors so that their needs can be fulfilled through other means and enhancing trade with other oil-enriching states. For enhancing energy security rapidly, custom duty on Ukrainian exports was also removed temporarily (European Council, 2016).  4.3 European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Multiple efforts have been made by EU and NATO to respond to emerging threats of hybrid warfare. Most of the measures taken and policies adopted are expected to continue for years, but with few amendments every time something new is witnessed. The individual efforts have significantly strengthened the role of both institutions in the international arena and signaled the world that all threats would be equally countered. EU has made considerable efforts in improving its defense capabilities, while NATO further focused on its core task of collective defense.  Despite the efforts, no significant outcome is certain. The on-going Ukrainian crisis further triggered all the security management services and acts. This clearly indicates the insufficiency of all counter actions in the fight against hybrid warfare. Thus, future implications for Europe and west are dependent on the supplementary actions of EU and NATO, and its subsequent results.  5. Implications for EU and NATO  The change in the security conditions and overall environment due to emergence of hybrid threats has once again made Europe’s defense capabilities and developments topical. The need of enhancing cooperation between European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization has become more necessary than ever before, as two are better than one.  5.1 Strategic Partnership – Paper vs. Practical Strategic partnership between EU and NATO is not something new in the history of international relations. It dates back to cold war period when the cooperation between the institutions became evident in the form of Western European Union (WEU). Western European Union is the former association (1954-2011) that worked as a foundation to address the matters of European Security and Defense and helped in the establishment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was later referred as the primary defense body of European Union from 1990s until it stepped down from its role in 2001 (Global Security, 2017).  In 1992, Maastricht Treaty put the basis of European Security and Defense Policy and gained support of NATO. It was then after the exchange of letter between NATO General Secretary and EU Presidency that in a meeting in Berlin, North Atlantic Council adapted a structure to actually build a European Security and Defense Policy (Lewis, 2013).  The scope of cooperation between EU and NATO could not be analyzed until 2000 as the official Joint Summit did not take place. However, the first practical example of the strategic partnership was witnessed in the Balkan Crisis of 2001, when both the organization came on the common ground and shared their views to respond to the crisis situation. Cooperation over security issues began an important question with the attack of 9/11 that greatly undermined the internal security of major powers. The attack was not exclusively the domestic issue of United States but also poses a threat to European security by marking a new era of warfare (Mattiisen, 2016).  European Union leaders realized the importance of taking strict measures against the changing security environment to protect its citizens, and institutions. In 2002, EU and NATO Declaration on European Security and Defense Policy declared them as strategic partners. Emphasis was given in the cooperation regarding crisis management activities, simultaneously promoting mutual decision making.  Berlin Plus agreement in the year 2003 allowed EU to use NATO forces, collective assets and capabilities, if required, to counter emerging threats and build resilience. European Security and Defense Policy that was launched at The European Council Cologne in 1999 transformed into Common Security and Defense Policy as a result of Lisbon Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty was signed by European members in 2007 that was entered into force in 2009. Lisbon Treaty and NATO’s strategic interest of 2010 (discussed in the previous chapter) compelled the alliance to work closely with international organization and enhance cooperation with EU for effective crisis management. It was understood that the enhanced cooperation and strategic partnership would ultimately promote peace and stability in the region (The Lisbon Treaty, 2013). The strategic partnership of EU and NATO does exist on paper over a decade but a little practical application of the partnership is viewed on the international front. Despite 22 common member states, the process has never been smooth. The main reason is the question of Cyprus and Turkey and less political will of states to respond to security issues with mutual consensus.  Jen Stoltenberg, NATO’s Secretary General, immediately after holding the office in 2014 indicated the importance of enhanced cooperation not only between two institutions but with the non-EU states too. 
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Ambassador Alexander Vershbow in the Inter-parliamentary Conference for Common Foreign and Security and Defense Policy in Riga responded to Russian hybrid threats and stated that further coordination is substantial to counter hybrid warfare, dispel propaganda and misinformation and defend shared democratic values. Stoltenberg, later in 2015, provided points for cooperation: 
• Building Resilience: Securing the European borders by strengthening defense and countering hybrid threats; 
• Improving relations with eastern and southern states; 
• Investment in the defense sector; 
• Boosting internal capabilities of European Allies; 
• Helping partners to become self-sufficient and capable for their own defense; 
• Need of military and political means, and diplomatic efforts (Stoltenberg, 2015). In 2016, NATO’s Warsaw Summit for the first time outlined the additional possibilities of EU-NATO cooperation in the counter actions of hybrid warfare, cyber defense, and development of defense capabilities, naval defense and military exercises (Segers, 2017). Russia’s expansionist aggressive policy was in no way acceptable by the European region, due to which several meetings were held to respond to unique form of threats. It was stated that European region faces more intense and wide range of security challenges than ever before. Even with the EU referendum and Brexit, NATO remained determined to support Europe for the war against hybrid threats. It was mainly because of the fact that the security of both organizations has always been interconnected. However, the strategic partnership of EU and NATO are merely words on paper which is not at all sufficient. Practical actions must be taken and hybrid approach must be adopted to counter hybrid threats. Actions with mutual interests would lead to more effective and timely response to the situation.  5.2 Implementation of Joint Declaration For the proper implementation and operationalization of Joint Declaration for responding to hybrid threats, President of European Council, President of European Commission and Secretary General of North Atlantic Treaty Organization are undergoing parallel procedures in the domains of situational awareness, cyber security, crisis prevention and strategic communication. European Center for Countering Hybrid Threats is expected to be established before the end of year 2017, taking EU and NATO partnership to next level. 5.2.1 Situational Awareness  By May 2017, tangible measures will be placed for speedy exchange of critical information between EU Hybrid Fusion Cell and relevant department of NATO. This would help in analyzing the changing nature of hybrid threats and taking relevant measures timely. In the globalized world, the situation awareness is not difficult to achieve. Therefore, EU-NATO is also working on the establishment of technical means to allow systemic exchange of information. 5.2.2 Strategic communication Enhancement of strategic partnership between EU and NATO is also dependent on the strategic communication between two forums. Several measures will be undertaken in the mid-2017 and these will be: 
• Persuade cooperation between EEAS Stratcom Division (specified tasks forces East and South) and NATO Strategic Communication Center of Excellence for further military exercise and joint training of armed forces. 
• Improve common fortifying endeavors in regards to foster Stratcom capabilities through coordinated actions. 5.2.3 Crisis Management Crisis management is the most important objective of EU-NATO strategic partnership. Readiness, therefore, must be enhances by regular state-to-state level meetings. Also, EU’s Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements and NATO’s Crisis Response System, needs to be synchronized to achieve the strategic goals by providing coherent support for hybrid threats. 5.2.4 Bolstering resilience By the end of 2017,  
• Staff contacts will be strengthened, including cross-briefings to separate bodies on resilience prerequisites.  
• Survey necessities, set up criteria and guidelines with regards to more prominent coherence between EU Capability Development Plan (CDP) and NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) (U.S Mission to NATO, 2017).  
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5.3 EU-NATO Cooperation on Hybrid Threats On December, 15, 2016, Head of states of European Union met in Brussels to discuss the future prospects of cooperation with NATO. EU realized that the threats from eastern and southern borders are huge and the sources are scarce. The cooperation between EU and NATO is not only good but extremely important in the fight against hybrid warfare. The only option is to develop a more strategic coordinated framework and invest on the defense capabilities of the western states. During the meeting, it was decided that EU must step up in terms of its security. United Kingdom has always guaranteed a balancing act between the organizations. This strategy, however, ended with Brexit but the efforts to enhance EU-NATO partnership continued.  5.3.1 Role of Sweden and Finland The prominent members of EU and special partners of NATO, Sweden and Finland, hold strong voices in all crisis management actions. The states have proved their credibility and competence by their active involvement in the European security and becoming part of Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, where political and security related issues are discussed on open common platform. Finland has also proposed an idea EU Center of Excellence to counter future hybrid threats and ensured its commitments in the establishment of center.  The threat from the eastern and southern borders of Europe, if not countered, would affect the security of Northern European states and Baltic region. The review of EU’s neighborhood policy suggested that the member states of the Union can play a role of lead partners in carrying out certain initiatives. The efforts of lead partners must be utilized to foster EU-NATO cooperation and bridge the gap between the two institutions (Wieslander, 2016).  Sweden and Finland were assumed take a lead in EU-NATO cooperation and building state resilience. This would ultimately protect the Baltic Sea security and prevent hybrid threats from reaching Northern European states. It would further reduce sense of competition between states of Baltic and Black sea region, by bringing them together and carrying out certain efforts in order to strengthen whole European community. The lead partners must also establish task groups and assign duties to them. 5.3.2 Baltic Sea Security The establishment of comprehensive maritime framework is necessary for the security of Baltic Sea region. It will not only review the status of existing hybrid threats but would endorse measures to deal with them EU, NATO and partners should take advantage from structure of the Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Riga to plan a similar center for more efficient strategic communication. In order to counter hybrid threats, a number of combined resilience building teams must be created after careful examination of the scenario. The lead partners, Sweden and Finland, should also provide expertise to these resilience teams. 5.3.3 Resilience to East  
• EU and NATO should develop a more coordinated framework to deal with vulnerabilities of states like Georgia and Ukraine, which are under direct threat of Russian hybrid warfare, and strengthen its resilience to east. The role of each organization must be clearly stated. 
• Staff level meetings must be conducted regularly for proper coordination. Exchange of information and assessments should be done related to projects, or otherwise. 
• A common platform should be established where states facing common challenges discuss strategies to deal with crisis. 5.3.4 EU Center of Excellence in Finland Recently, several EU and NATO members agreed and signed up to establish a new Center of Excellence. A signing ceremony was held in Helsinki, Finland on April 11, 2017. The establishment of center is one of the significant steps taken till now in the path of tackling hybrid threats. The center would have at least 10 experts from member states to carry out research in understanding the diversified nature of hybrid warfare and address them accordingly.  In an interview, Tino Soini, Finish Foreign Minister said that Hybrid threats have become a permanent part of European security. Finland has taken a great initiative which has literally boosted EU-NATO cooperation in this regard. The budget of this research cell is estimated to be around $ 1.6 million, half of which will be contributed by Finland (Reuters, 2017). European Union has showed full support to the establishment of Center of Excellence and strongly believes that it will further enhance the relation with NATO. The High Representatives of the Union of Foreign Affairs, like EU, has also declared their full support in the fight against hybrid threats and help the Center of Excellence in the effective strategic planning. NATO allies, along EU members assembled in the ceremony in Helsinki. The Memorandum of Understanding, which will open later in the year, was signed by nine nations: Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States of America. Many other nations are also expected to join in the upcoming months (EEAS, 2017).  EU and NATO, however, are not the signatories of this Memorandum but are willing to cooperate in every 
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possible way and partake actively in the center’s activities.  5.4 Impact of Trump Presidency Further implications for European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be determined by evaluating the role of United States in the contemporary scenario. The recent elections of United States and Trump Presidency have certainly brought attention to new dimensions of US-Russia relationship. Since the fall of Soviet Union, United States and Russia has undergone strange relationship. Despite their long rivalry, Russia has collaborated with U.S on certain issues, like participation in the international coalition during first Gulf War in 1990 and backing U.S in its fight against terrorism. Though, analysts and world leaders always identify Russia’s relations with west as a roller coaster ride, mainly because of the realist approach of Vladimir Putin. Putin always kept a stance that any gain of west is equivalent to the loss for Russia.  Putin also felt threatened with the EU-NATO expansion to east, in countries that were once part of Soviet republic. In his point of view, it was western intrusion on Russia’s historic “sphere of influence”. The 2008 NATO summit at Bucharest, which offered membership to Georgia and Ukraine, further aggravated Russia to use force against its neighbors. The military intervention of Russia initiated Georgia War 2008 and raised tensions in Europe. Regardless of Obama’s policy of reset relations with Russia, the relations of Russia and U.S kept deteriorating.  The red line was once again crossed when EU invited Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement. It provoked Putin to intervene in Ukraine that resulted in the annexation Crimea. The nature of hybrid threats was much more complex this time. EU and Obama administration responded to this by imposing sanctions on Russia that were not well received by Russia. Donald Trump, 45th President of United States of America, has exhibited enthrallment for strong leadership and emphasized on developing strong ties with Putin’s Russia. During the campaign, Trump asserted confidently that: “I think that I would probably get along with him very well." Trump’s victory opened ways for a “détente” in US-Russia relations in the upcoming years. It, however, initiated immediately after Trump held office, when Putin congratulated him over a call and assured his support for strengthening relations (Barichella, 2017). 5.4.1 Détente Strategy Russia and U.S realizes the difficulties that will come their way while building stronger relations but both the states are willing to play their part. President Trump also informed media that U.S will take all the possible steps to enhance bilateral relationship. The détente strategy could have both positive and negative implications for Europe, depending on how it is perceived. Firstly, the détente with Russia would boost the economy of Europe in lieu. The sanctions imposed jointly by EU and US have not only affected Russia, but whole Europe. The economic downturn hit the European countries because of their major reliability of the Russian energy resources.  Secondly, the US strategy would also put a halt to Russia’s aggressive stance and prevent direct military intervention. The sanctions triggered Russia to adopt provocative stance and intrude in the European space. Russia also invested a lot in its nuclear capabilities since then. It enhanced nuclear arsenals on European borders and refused to sign three nuclear deals with U.S. It is definitely not a good signal for West. Hence, the establishment of stronger relations would prevent escalation of hybrid threats in the region. United States understands that hybrid warfare is not just regional threat of Europe, but could lead to drastic consequences for the whole world.  For détente to happen, it is important to remove economic sanctions on Russia. The removal of economic sanctions would only be on the condition that Russia compromise on Crimean Peninsula and return it to Ukraine, which is quite an impossible situation in the contemporary scenario. Similarly, the crisis in Ukraine is also less likely to reach to any mutual agreement between the conflicting parties. Hence, the détente is very difficult to attain in near future. Europe feels insecure that the Trump’s isolationist approach would ultimately lead him signing a deal with Putin. Donald Trump, like Harry Truman, strongly believes that attempts of strengthening ties with democratic states highlights the weakness of United States (Schuman, 2017). Any bilateral agreement between Russia and U.S would simply undermine the security of Europe, as it will provide a green signal to Russia to intervene in Europe and increase its sphere of influence. Anyhow, the agreement is only possible at the cost of losing certain European partners of United States. A scenario like this is in no way favorable for U.S, since many European states have backed and supported U.S in its fight against terrorism. Transatlantic alliance has always been main agenda of the west.  5.4.2 Possible Solutions Since the U.S Presidential elections, European remained vigilant and accessed the role of Trump with regards to Russia. Trump was also invited to attend EU Summit, in order to carry out an open dialogue. European Union must expand its efforts and promote the idea of open dialogue so that all the dimensions of the scenario could be discussed. 
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Also, EU member states should increase their military spending to intimate the opponent force of their internal capabilities. The increased spending would make EU essential on the world stage and gain attention of Trump’s administration. EU should also work on playing a role of mediator between U.S and Russia to considerably reduce all potential threats from Russia.  The strategy of becoming mediator could only be successful if EU provides practical solutions to reduce hybrid threats and end the rivalry. For example, EU should force Ukraine to declare neutrality. However, it would still not resolve the issue of Crimean Peninsula, but the neutral Ukraine would prevent the direct military intervention of Russia in another European states.The other proposed solution could be the freezing of NATO for a small period of time, in order to prevent its resilience to east that has heightened the tensions to much extent.  Despite this, EU must come clear to Trump that NATO prime responsibility as a defense alliance is to ensure the security of borders. In case of any threat, it should reinforce its military to counter any potential threat. EU is quite rigid when it’s about the resolution of conflict with Russia. EU emphasizes that any Yalta-agreement that provides right to Russia to increase its sphere of influence is in no way acceptable, irrespective of what Putin has to offer to EU. However, such stance would never help EU in playing its role as a mediator. For better future prospects, EU must comply with its mediation duties as it would not prevent the disengagement of U.S from European countries but the chances of Trump signing a bilateral agreement would also reduce. Considering nature of European Union, it can easily play a role of mediator. Firstly, as a regional organization, EU can remain impartial and provide solutions accordingly. Secondly, the organization is more cohesive than any other and has already served as mediator in Georgia War following Russian military intervention. There’s a great potential and possibility for EU to make itself as a vital ally of U.S. But it’s merely dependent on the future policies and strategies of Donald Trump, which at the moment are unclear. The success of all the possible solutions will derive various outcomes for states at different levels accordingly.  6. Conclusion Hybrid warfare is the use of conventional military capabilities and tactics that are closely related to guerilla warfare in order to achieve political objectives. The techniques and tactics of hybrid warfare are used at the expense of the adversary in a way that the conflict remains local and below the threshold of any foreign military intervention. Russia’s use of hybrid warfare is to increase its sphere of influence on less vulnerable states that were once part of Soviet Republic. Hybrid warfare is an emerging phenomenon that could be much more fatal in the years to come. The changing security environment of Europe and the increased threat within the region has raised many questions on the functioning of international organizations, especially European Union and North Atlantic Treaty organization. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine has substantially affected the security of eastern borders of Europe. EU and NATO, therefore, are taking several independent and collective measures in order to cooperate together and venture out together on the mission of countering hybrid threats. European Union actions on enacting sanctions on Russia and isolating it can possibly be criticized as many western states are depended on Russia for oil and energy resources. However, the recent initiative of establishing Center of Excellence in Finland is considered to be one of the most significant practical developments in countering hybrid warfare till now. The future of this center is quite unpredictable at this time but in order to reach to some real solutions, it is important to form a fully integrated system within the center. Further, the Trump’s inclination towards Putin has raised new challenges for European region. Europe is focusing on becoming indispensible ally of United States to gain its support and collectively counter Russian Hybrid Warfare. The forthcoming security policies of Trump will clear the picture soon.  6.1 Recommendations 
• More practical application of EU-NATO is required that is only possible when all sorts of problems, which hinders the process of mutual decision making, are resolved immediately. 
• RAP must broaden its role and focus beyond strengthening military. NATO should develop whole-of-society approach to enhance its cooperation with EU. 
• NATO, being a nuclear defense alliance, should send a signal to opponent forces that every threat would be responded equally, thus increasing the overall risk factor. 
• NATO should also take number of steps to counter hybrid threats: 1) Strengthen conventional air, sea and land capabilities; 2) Invest lavishly in intelligence activities to improve their working; 3) Organized training of Special Forces to increase their internal capabilities.  
• EU, on the other hand, requires more strong military CSDP capabilities. This will require more up-to-date tactical nuclear weapons and trained troops. 
• EU should also take Baltic States in confidence and ensure that equal rights are given to Russian 
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speaking minorities living in that region. 
• United States should also take few steps to counter existing and potential hybrid threats: 1) Strengthen unconventional warfare capabilities; 2) Increase civilian education opportunities for Special Forces; 3) Relocate forces in countries at risk to pose intensified threat to adversary; 4) Coordinate with host-countries to build less or non-violent resistance capabilities; 5) US-EU mutual efforts to intervene in areas where minorities are at-risk.  References Al-Mannai, A. (2016). What is Martin van Creveld’s concept of Transformation of War, and how is it relevant in understanding current conflicts? Centre for 5th Generation Warfare Studies. http://www.da-ic.org/5gen/2016/08/28/nail-can-ilhan-what-is-martin-van-crevelds-concept-of-transformation-of-war-and-how-is-it-relevant-in-understanding-current-conflicts/. Accessed on 28th November, 2016. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept. NATO Review Magazine, 1999. http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. Accessed on 25th February, 2017. Amotsbakken, M. (2012). Explaining Russian crisis-management: Foreign Policy Analysis of Russian policies. Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/268543/555667_FULLTEXT01.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed on 11th January 2017. Aolain, F. N. (2014).  A Roundup of European Union Response to Ukrainian Crisis. Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/10026/roundup-eu-responses-ukraine-crisis/. Accessed on 9th March, 2017. Archick, K., Gallis, P. (2008). NATO and the European Union. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32342.pdf. Accessed on 20th February, 2017. Bachmann, S. D. O.V. (2012). Hybrid Threats, Cyber Warfare and NATO’s Comprehensive Approach for Countering 21st Century Threats – Mapping the New Frontier of Global Risk and Security Management. Amicus Curiae, Vol. 88. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989808. Accessed on 25th June, 2016. Bassford, C. (1993). Jomini and Clausewitz – Their interaction. Georgia State University. https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Jomini/JOMINIX.htm. Accessed on 25th November, 2016. Belli, T. (2015). The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. https://www.theatrum-belli.com/the-military-doctrine-of-the-russian-federation/. Accessed on 22nd February, 2017. Berlin Plus Agreement. NATO Review Magazine, 2004. http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm. Accessed on 25th February, 2017. Boot, M. (2016). How to Wage Hybrid War on the Kremlin. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/13/how-to-wage-hybrid-war-on-the-kremlin/. Accessed on 6th December, 2016. Burt, J., Hitch, J. & Pettibone, P. (2016). A 3-Step Strategy for Trump on Ukraine. The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/3-step-strategy-trump-ukraine-18403. Accessed on 28th March, 2017. Dajic, O. (2015). The state of play of the EU – NATO partnership. European Leadership Network. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-state-of-play-of-the-eunato-partnership_3076.html. Accessed on 5th June, 2016. Davis, J. R. (2013). Defeating Future Hybrid Threats: The Greatest Challenge to the Army Profession of 2020 and Beyond. Military Review, Vol. 93. https://www.idmarch.org/document/Anti-aircraft+warfare/qWq9-show/Defeating+Future+Hybrid+Threats+The+Greatest+Challenge+to+the+Army+Profession+of+2020+and+Beyond. Accessed on 22th July, 2016. Davis, J. (2015). Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats. Cover Story, The Three Sword Magazine. http://ileridunya.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CONTINUED_EVOLUTION_OF_HYBRID_THREATS.pdf. Accessed on 19th July, 2016. Dempsey, J. (2015). Judy Asks: Will Hybrid Warfare Defeat Europe? Judy Dempsey’s Strategic Europe. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/59930. Accessed on 13th March, 2017. Dickinson, P. (2017). Putin Is a Prisoner of His Own Hybrid War. Atlantic Council, NATO Source. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-is-a-prisoner-of-his-own-hybrid-war. Accessed on 6th April, 2017. Dominik, B. S. (2015). Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century’s New Threats to Global Peace and Security. Bournemouth University, UK. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506063. Accessed on 19th June, 2016. Drent, M., Hendriks, R., Zandee, D. (2015). New Threats, New EU and NATO Responses. Clingendael Report. https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/New%20Threats_New%20EU_Nato%20Responses_Clingend
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.64, 2018  
30 
ael_July2015.pdf. Accessed on 7th June, 2016. Euro-Atlantic Partnership. NATO Review Magazine, 2017. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67979.htm. Accessed on 12th March, 2017. European Council. (2014). Foreign Affairs Council. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2014/03/03/. Accessed on 2nd April, 2017. European Council. (2016). EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/. Accessed on 6th March, 2017. European Council. (2017). EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/history-ukraine-crisis/. Accessed on 6th March, 2017. European Commission. (2016). Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council. https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/EU-160406-JointFrameworkOnCounteringHybridThreats.pdf. Accessed on 17th February, 2017. European Commission. (2016). Security: EU strengthens response to hybrid threats. Press Release – European Commission. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-1227_en.htm. Accessed on 10th March, 2017. European Parliament. (2017). The EU's response to the crisis in Ukraine. http://www.eppgroup.eu/our-priority/The-EU%27s-response-to-the-crisis-in-Ukraine. Accessed on 7th March, 2017. FAQ sheet: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. (2016). Brussels. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1250_en.htm. Accessed on 2nd June, 2016. Gazprom. (2017). http://www.gazprom.com/. Accessed on 17th March, 2017. Georgia Russia Conflict Fast Facts. CNN Library, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/13/world/europe/2008-georgia-russia-conflict/. Accessed on 19th February, 2017. Giles, K., Hanson, P. & Lyne, R. (2015). The Russian Challenge. Chatham House Report. http://www.academia.edu/19557277/Russias_Toolkit, Accessed on 19th March, 2017. Goure, D. (2016). NATO vs. Russia: How to Counter the Hybrid Warfare Challenge. The Buzz, the National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/nato-vs-russia-how-counter-the-hybrid-warfare-challenge-16874. Accessed on 4th July, 2016. Harmata, M. (2013). Gazprom vs. Chevron: A battle of Titans over the future of an energy island. Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). http://beyondthe.eu/gazprom-vs-chevron-a-battle-of-titans-over-the-future-of-an-energy-island/. Accessed on 5th December, 2016. Hybrid Warfare in the Age of Trump. Think Tank, Brooklyn Art Project, 2017. http://www.brooklynartproject.com/profiles/blogs/hybrid-warfare-in-the-age-of-trump. Accessed on 3rd April, 2017. Joel, A. J. (2015). What we talk about, when we talk about ‘Hybrid Threats’. EUISS research paper prepared for the European Defence Agency, Paris. http://diplomacy.bg/archives/1567?lang=en. Accessed on 2nd June, 2016. Kert, M., Aubyn, S. (2016).EU Policy on Fighting Hybrid Threats. https://ccdcoe.org/eu-policy-fighting-hybrid-threats.html. Accessed on 6th June, 2016. Kofman, M. (2016). Russian Hybrid Warfare and Other Darker Arts. http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/russian-hybrid-warfare-and-other-dark-arts/. Accessed on 11th July, 2016. Kremlin hybrid war tactics in Georgia, 2008, and Ukraine, 2014-2015. Euromaidan Press, 2015. http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/09/05/kremlin-hybrid-war-tactics-in-georgia-2008-and-ukraine-2014-2015-infographic/#arvlbdata. Accessed on 11th March, 2017. Laywell, C. (2014). The Islamic State is a Hybrid Threat: Why Does That Matter? Homeland Security Digital Library, 2016. https://www.hsdl.org/blog/newpost/view/the-islamic-state-is-a-hybrid-threat-br-why-does-that-matter. Accessed on 10th July, 2016. Lendman, S. (2014). NATO Summit: “Global Police Force” and “Readiness Action Plan” against Russia. Global Research. http://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-summit-day-two-global-police-force-and-readiness-action-plan-against-russia/5399916. Accessed on 5th March, 2017. Lobjakas, A. (2009). EU Report on 2008 War Tilts Against Georgia. Radio Free Europe, Europe Liberty. http://www.rferl.org/a/EU_Report_On_2008_War_Tilts_Against_Georgia/1840447.html. Accessed on 9th March, 2017. Lonardo, L. (2017). EU-NATO Relations in the Era of Trump and of the European Defence Union. E-International Relations. http://www.e-ir.info/2017/02/17/eu-nato-relations-in-the-era-of-trump-and-of-the-european-defence-union/. Accessed on 2nd April, 2017. Luhn, A. (2015). 15 years of Vladimir Putin: 15 ways he has changed Russia and the world. The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/06/vladimir-putin-15-ways-he-changed-russia-world. Accessed on 7th February, 2017. Marcel, M. (2016). A New Typology Of War – The Hybrid War. “Nicolae Balcescu” Land Forces Academy, 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.64, 2018  
31 
Sibiu, Romania. https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwioqbHGkZLTAhWE8RQKHfS4BgwQFggZMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.armyacademy.ro%2Freviste%2Frev1_2016%2FNEAG.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGMl3TpKfeA09YQkozXW31rCl5Ptg&sig2=L4QSrehqF_DWYvKXTZ8svQ. Accessed on 2nd December, 2016. Marine Le Pen insists Russian annexation of Crimea is totally legitimate. Independent, 2017. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/marine-le-pen-crimea-russia-putin-ukraine-illegal-annexation-france-front-national-fn-a7507361.html. Accessed on 10th April, 2017. Matheson, T. (2015). EU-NATO Efforts to Counter Hybrid Warfare. Leksika. http://www.leksika.org/tacticalanalysis/eu-nato-efforts-to-counter-hybrid-warfare. Accessed on 8th December, 2016. Matthews, O. (2016). Donald Trump Can Either Continue the Shadow War with Vladimir Putin or End Sanctions. Newsweek. http://www.newsweek.com/2016/11/25/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-russia-cyber-war-sanction-521580.html. Accessed on 3rd April 2017. McMahon, M. (2014). Ukraine in Crisis. CFR Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/ukraine/ukraine-crisis/p32540. Accessed on 5th January, 2017. Mattiisen, A. M. (2016). NATO–EU Cooperation in the Context of Hybrid Threats. Diplomaatia. https://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/nato-eu-cooperation-in-the-context-of-hybrid-threats/. Accessed on 5th March, 2017. Miranda, J. (2015). Hybrid Warfare: NATO’s New Strategic Challenge? Draft General Report, 15. http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=3778. Accessed on 11th July, 2016. Nevskaya, A. (2016). Russia-EU economic relations: Assessing two years of sanctions. http://www.russia-direct.org/analysis/russia-eu-economic-relations-assessing-two-years-sanctions. Accessed on 5 April, 2017. Pawlack, P. (2015). Understanding Hybrid Threats. Members' Research Service. https://epthinktank.eu/2015/06/24/understanding-hybrid-threats/. Accessed on 2nd June, 2016. Pernik, P. (2015). EU and NATO: Enhancing cooperation to counter hybrid threats. European Leadership Network. http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/eu-and-nato-enhancing-cooperation-to-counter-hybrid-threats_3103.html. Accessed on 13th July, 2016. Pernik, P., Hunter, E. (2015). The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare. International Center for Defense and Security. https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Eve_Hunter__Piret_Pernik_-_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf. Accessed on 16th March, 2017. Pomerantsev, P. (2014). How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare? Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/05/how-putin-is-reinventing-warfare/. Accessed on 5th December, 2016. Putin & Trump signal new Russia-US partnership with 1st phone call on ISIS, trade & Ukraine. RT, Question More, 2017. https://www.rt.com/news/375416-putin-trump-telephone-call/. Accessed on 31st March, 2017. NATO and EU Members Join Finland’s New Center for Countering Hybrid Threats. Atlantic Council, NATO Source, 2017. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-and-eu-members-join-finland-s-new-center-for-countering-hybrid-threats. Accessed on 13th April, 2017. NATO-EU Relations. (2017). NATO Multimedia Library. http://www.natolibguides.info/nato-eu. Accessed on 31st March, 2017. NATO-EU Statement. (2017). U.S Mission to North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://nato.usmission.gov/nato-eu-statement/. Accessed on 5th April, 2017. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. (2007). NATO-EU operational cooperation. 2007 Annual Session. http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1168. Accessed on 26th March, 2017. NATO-Russia Council. NATO, 2017. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm. Accessed on 1st April, 2017. Osnos, E., Remnick, D. &Yaffa, J. (2017).Trump, Putin, and the New Cold War. The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/06/trump-putin-and-the-new-cold-war. Accessed on 30th March, 2017. Readiness Action Plan. NATO Review Magazine, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium, 2015. https://www.shape.nato.int/readiness-action-plan. Accessed on 4th March, 2017. Readiness Action Plan, NATO’s Fact Sheet, 2015. https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&sqi=2&ved=0ahUKEwj51_6JuY3TAhWIBBoKHe_yDHkQFggeMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nato.int%2Fnato_static_fl2014%2Fassets%2Fpdf%2Fpdf_2015_12%2F20151130_1512-factsheet_rap_en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEtzzZAcj8mxPcWofonBKpsd9CPaQ&sig2=__amKmUh38w4zk7xQ6n5Sg&bvm=bv.151426398,d.d2s. Accessed on 4th March, 2017. Relations with the European Union. NATO Review Magazine, 2017. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm. Accessed on 4th April, 2017. 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.64, 2018  
32 
Russia’s Hybrid Warfare and Threats for Georgia. Georgia Today, 2015. http://georgiatoday.ge/news/1334/Russia%E2%80%99s-Hybrid-Warfare-and-Threats-for-Georgia. Accessed on 13th January, 2017. Russian Military Doctrine. The Global Security, 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/doctrine.htm. Accessed on 3rd February, 2017. Russian-Ukrainian-EU gas conflict: who stands to lose most? NATO Review Magazine, 2016. http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/NATO-Energy-security-running-on-empty/Ukrainian-conflict-Russia-annexation-of-Crimea/EN/index.htm. Accessed on 6th April, 2017. Segers, N. (2017). Making Civil Society an Inclusive Partner in Countering Hybrid Threats.Atlantic Expedition, Modernizing Transatlantic Relations. http://atlantic-expedition.org/making-civil-society-an-inclusive-partner-in-countering-hybrid-threats/. Accessed on 20th March, 2017. Seng, G.T. (1999). Clausewitz and His Impact on Strategy. Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces, Vol.25 No. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/1999/Vol25_1/6.htm. Accessed on 28th November, 2016.  http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/GohTeckSengArticle.htm Shevchuk, Z. (2016). Russian hybrid warfare in Georgia and Ukraine. ISA's 57th Annual Convention. https://www.muni.cz/en/research/publications/1368633. Accessed on 31st January, 2017. Shuster, S. (2016). How Donald Trump Made the U.S. a Target for Russia's New Brand Of Warfare. Time, World. http://time.com/4427551/donald-trump-hack-vladimir-putin/. Accessed on 7th April, 2017. Singh, R. (2015). EU and U.S split over response to Russia-Ukraine crisis. News Report, Parliament Magazine. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/eu-and-us-split-over-response-russia-ukraine-crisis. Accessed on 9th March, 2017. Snegovaya, M. (2015). 'Reflexive control': Putin’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine is straight out of the Soviet playbook. Journal, Institute for the Study of War. http://www.businessinsider.com/reflexive-control-putins-hybrid-warfare-in-ukraine-is-straight-out-of-the-soviet-playbook-2015-9. Accessed on 7th December, 2016. Standish, R., Tamkin, E. (2017). Europe and U.S. Move to Fight Russian Hybrid Warfare. Foreign Policy, The Magazine. http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/11/europe-and-u-s-move-to-fight-russian-hybrid-warfare/. Accessed on 1st April, 2017. The EU's 'strategic agenda' until 2020 - leaked document. (2014). The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/10919833/The-EUs-strategic-agenda-until-2020-leaked-document.html. Accessed on 12th April, 2017. The Trump Presidency. EPSC, European Political Strategy Centre, European Commission, 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/other-publications/trump-presidency_en#h-3. Accessed on 8th April, 2017. The Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922. Office of the Historian, 2017. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/naval-conference. Accessed on 15th March, 2017. Thompson, N. (2017). Ukraine: Everything you need to know about how we got here. CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/2015/02/10/europe/ukraine-war-how-we-got-here/. Accessed on 16th March, 2017. Tziarras, Z. (2011). Clausewitz’s Remarkable Trinity Today. The GW Post. https://thegwpost.com/2011/11/09/clausewitz%E2%80%99s-remarkable-trinity-today/. Accessed on 29th November, 2016. Valasek, T. (2007). The roadmap to better EU-NATO relations. Centre for European Reform, London. http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing_tv_eu_nato_ 20dec07.pdf. Accessed on 2nd March 2017. Wales Summit Declaration. NATO Review Magazine, 2014. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. Accessed on 5th March, 2017. Warsaw Summit Communiqué. NATO, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm. Accessed on 18th March, 2017. Waterfield, B. (2009). EU blames Georgia for starting war with Russia. The Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/georgia/6247620/EU-blames-Georgia-for-starting-war-with-Russia.html. Accessed on 15th February, 2017. Wieslander, A. (2016). Sweden and Finland Should Lead EU-NATO Cooperation on Hybrid and Resilience. Atlantic Council, NATO Source. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/sweden-and-finland-should-lead-eu-nato-cooperation-on-hybrid-and-resilience. Accessed on 12th April, 2017. Williamson, S. C. (2009). From Fourth Generation Warfare To Hybrid War. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. https://www.google.com.pk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjH86_rkJLTAhXBPxoKHSUXAzgQFggZMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Findianstrategicknowledgeonline.com%2Fweb%2FFROM%2520FOURTH%2520GENERATION%2520to%2520hybrid.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFyZRJYoHoSsaQR5UVzeiiNvZHD9A&sig2=IhIZgdy1f06s1DisBrqgvw, Accessed on 6th December, 2016. 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) Vol.64, 2018  
33 
Wilson, G. I. (1989) The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. Marine Corps Gazette. http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/lind/the-changing-face-of-war-into-the-fourth-generation.html. Accessed on 25th November, 2016. pp. 22-26.  Ilsa Irfan holds a bachelor’s degree in International Relations from Kinnaird College for Women. She is currently pursuing her master’s degree in Peace and Conflict studies at Center for International Peace and Stability, NUST.  Acknowledgment I would also like to extend my sincere gratitude to all those who helped me during this intellectual journey. This would not have been possible without the continuous support, assistance and encouragement of my parents and teachers. I am also exceptionally grateful to my supervisor, Miss Arifa Kayani, for her guidance. Her immense knowledge in International Relations has benefitted me throughout my bachelors. 
